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I. Introduction 
While many economists define a "bubble" as a deviation from stock market 
fundamentals, Charles Kindleberger defines a bubble as an upward price movement over 
an extended range that tends to implode (Kindleberger 1996). An extended negative 
bubble is a crash. The nature of these beasts makes them very important to the investor. 
Business schools teach students about the efficient market hypothesis and the 
economically rational individual. Bubbles make investing difficult because prices deviate 
from their fundamental valuations. If market fundamentals can not predict prices, the 
investor is forced to learn new ways of investing. 
From 1985 until 2000, the price of stocks increased exponentially. Financial 
analysts wondered ifwe were in a "new" economy or simply a bubble. Were the 
fundamentals of stocks changing to support the rapid growth or did a bubble exist? 
Three competing viewpoints exist on bubbles. The more traditional theory 
applied to market bubbles is the adaptive expectation theory. When individuals apply 
this theory, they look to the past to judge the correct price of a stock. Ratios and trend 
analysis are important to picking a winning portfolio. Subscribers to the adaptive 
expectations theory believe investors are backward looking in deciding on the correct 
price to pay for a stock. In the literature review section, several previous studies will be 
presented to solidifY this argument. 
More inclusive than the adaptive expectations theory, the rational expectations 
theory builds off the concept that investors are fOlWard looking. Investors act on the 
basis that they realize the correct model of how the world works and that they use all 
available information in deciding on their actions (Poole 2000). Unlike adaptive 
expectations, rational expectations incorporates both past performance and future 
earnings into the price evaluation. Investors integrate monetary policy and other 
macroeconomic variables into their investment decisions. Unlike price to earnings ratios 
and trend analysis, rational expectation variables are not based solely on past 
performance. As with the adaptive expectations model, previous studies based on 
rational expectations will be studied in the literature review. 
With both rational expectations and adaptive expectations, investors base the 
price of a stock on some expected future profits discounted for the time value ofmoney. 
The equation might look like this: 
Pstock (Sum future Profits / (1 + r)~/ Outstanding Shares 
where P is price of stock, r is the interest rate, and t is the future time period that 
payments are expected to be discounted. The difference between the two theories is 
how they arrive at the expected future profit sum. Adaptive looks towards the past to 
judge this sum, while rational expectations looks both towards the past and the future 
while incorporating macroeconomic policies into the valuation. Both theories present a 
viable explanation of the direction of stock prices over the long run. 
Do the long run theories of adaptive expectations and rational expectations 
present an adequate reason on why stock prices fluctuate so? If the stock market grows 
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an average of6% per year, why did S & P 500 prices increase in the 1980s and 1990s so 
drastically? These changes in price valuation are so dramatic that traditional models 
have difficulty explaining them (Poole 2000). This is the argument for the third stock 
price determination model. As Keynes said: 
A conventional valuation which is established as the outcome of the mass 
psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals is liable to change violently 
as the result of the sudden fluctuation of opinion due to factors which do not 
really make much difference in the prospective yield. 
So if investors are uninformed, how do I measure the unimportant variables that they 
use to base their investments on? Furthermore, how do I even discover these 
extraneous variables? This task ofdiscovery is quite impossible due to the large number 
of differing opinions on how stock should be priced. However, it is possible to judge 
the aggregate effect of this "herd mentality" by analyzing how people react after they 
incorporate their unimportant variables into their investing decision. A good measure of 
people's reaction is opinion indices like those based on consumer confidence or 
consumer sentiment. If the crowd feels generally bullish about the market, a bubble 
might form until it is popped by a general bearish feeling about the market. If I focus on 
investor confidence and investor sentiment, crowd psychology can be analyzed. 
While impossible to illuminate the individual causes of herd mentality, the overall 
effect can be discovered through opinion polls. My hypothesis is that when investors 
exhibit herd mentality in choosing stocks, they create a market bubble. 
II. Literature Review 
The literature I reviewed promotes many different interpretations ofhow and 
why bubbles occur. The following categories break down the works into their 
3 
respective philosophical foundations. 
Adaptive and Rational Expectations: 
In investing, there has always been a division between the investor that analyzes 
the past (i.e. By looking at price to earning, earnings per share, and other ratios, etc.) or 
by being fOIWard looking and studying rational expectations. Under the adaptive 
expectations model, investors look into the past to judge what a stock will do in the 
future. Their argument can be clearly illuminated by the statement "what a company will 
do in the future is best represented by what they've done in the past." If this model is 
accurate regarding stock price evaluation, then variables that measure past perfonnance 
should correctly predict and explain variations in stock prices. An economist named 
Harold Biennan analyzed the Dow Jones Industrial Average from the mid 1980s until 
the early 1990s. Using the price to earnings ratio for the stocks in the index, he studied 
whether the crash in October of 1987 was a result of a separation from fundamental 
stock prices (Biennan 54). Bierman supports the idea that market prices are determined 
from backward looking investors. The article discusses the use ofprice to earnings 
ratios to determine excess market valuations. Bierman concluded that the October 1987 
levels of the Dow Jones Industrial Average were not excessive. Ifa researcher analyzes 
the growth rate of the highest point in 1987 (2722 points before the crash) to 1994, the 
annualized return is 5.7% (Biennan 64). As his study concludes, adding in dividends 
paid makes the return "decent" (Biennan 64). 
With rational expectations, investors focus on the future. If a company 
has hired a top-notch management staff, then they should be profitable in the future. 
Economic agents predict future events that are not falsified by actual events. Rational 
expectation theory assumes homogeneous investors who share expectations of an asset's 
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future price, and who instantaneously and rationally discount all market information into 
this price (Knapp 1). Investors will COnshllct their opinions in such a way that on the 
average, they are correct. Because of the focus on forward looking behavior, rational 
expectation theory has drastic implications for bubbles. 
The major implication with rational expectation theory is that future events are 
already built into the price equation of the stock so that only random news will cause the 
price change of a stock (Baxter and Davis 1998). This randomness in stock price 
changes leads to the "random walk" theory ofunpredictable stock price movements. 
Niamh Brodie stated "Fundamental analysis, broadly speaking, values shares 
according to three factors; the state ofthe economy, the state of the industry in 
question, and the earning power and potential performance of a particular 
company.. .The essence ofa correct price is not that it predicts thefuture, but that it 
fully captures the uncertainties of the future." (Brodie 1). Rational expectations theory 
suggests that stock prices are correctly valued at all times. 
When rational expectations is tested empirically, several conclusions can be 
reached. The problem with rational expectations theory is when the empirical data does 
not match the model proposed. The researcher can claim that the model is wrong and 
that rational expectations still holds (Melberg). The researcher can also conclude that 
the model is correct, but that the results indicate that agents are not rational (Melberg). 
If the empirical data match the rational expectations model, then the problems that arise 
if the model does not match are alleviated. 
If expectations are rational, Sheffrin argues that "expectations must be unbiased 
(no systematic mistakes), efficient (use all past information about the variable), 
consistent (forecasts at different times should not conflict) and the forecast-error must 
be unpredictable" (Melberg). 
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Asymmetric Infonnation Model: 
Until recently, economists have avoided the idea that herd mentality creates 
bubbles. No fonnal tests existed for asset-priced bubbles because the hypothesis about 
how asset holders' expectations evolve over time did not exist (Diba 1990). However, 
the advent ofthe rational expectations hypothesis provided the foundation for rational 
bubbles. 
As Shiller points out in his book titled "Irrational Exuberance," completely 
rational people can participate in herd behavior. The behavior is individually rational, 
but when combined produces group behavior that mirrors irrationality (Shiller 2000). 
The reason for herd behavior according to his theory is information cascade. His idea 
of an information cascade is simply reliance of an individual on another's choice. Two 
people decide to go out to eat. The first chooses one oftwo empty restaurants simply 
by tossing a coin. The second person sees the first person eating in the restaurant and 
concludes that it must be better since the first person is eating in it. As Shiller says, "If 
all of them had been able to pool their first impressions and discuss these as a group, 
they might have been able to deduce which restaurant was likely to be the better one. 
But in this scenario they cannot make use of each other's information, since they do not 
reveal their own infonnation to others when they merely follow them." The the01y of 
information cascades is a theory of the failure of information about true fundamental 
value to be disseminated and evaluated (Shiller 2000). Individuals can be rational 
individuals and still exhibit herd mentality. 
Extraneous factors can be incorporated into the bubble model without violating 
rational expectations or long-run equilibrium towards fundamental valuation. The 
creation and destruction of a bubble arises from some extraneous event that is oflittle 
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significance to the fundamental valuation of a stock (Diba 1990). The very same reason 
why a bubble forms may destroy the bubble. The growth of a bubble and its deviation 
from fundamental valuation can be studied through herd mentality. The nature of the 
bubble's self-perpetuation is described in the next paragraph. 
The key to understanding how bubbles operate is that the individual investor 
realizes that the asset is overpriced. Bubbles form because ofherd mentality that exists 
in crowds. This herd mentality can be explained by how investors view their overvalued 
assets. A bubble grows at an exponential rate greater than the fundamental valuation 
growth rate, because an agent would not hold an overvalued asset unless they expect it 
to be overvalued a sufficiently greater amount next period (Diba 1990). Another way of 
stating this concept is called the greater fool theory (National Automobile, Aerospace 
and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada). 1 The investor realizes that the 
stock is overvalued, but is willing to pay the amount because he thinks that there is a 
greater fool that will pay even more for the price of the stock. The realization of the 
overvaluation, but willingness to invest is herd mentality. Figure 1 is a diagram ofhow 
bubbles expand: 
National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of 
Canada's acronym is CAW TCA and will be refeued to as such in the rest of the article. 
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HOW BUBBLES EXPAND: 
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Figure I 
The cyclical nature ofthe bubble is evident from the diagram Initially, asset prices rise 
(either by a general rise in fundamental prices or herd mentality). However, the bubble 
forms when investors "jump on the bandwagon" to profit from rising prices (CAW 
TCA). They borrow money from investment institutions because of their increased 
wealth. This borrowing leads to even greater asset prices. However, the bubble will 
eventually burst. Figure 2 shows how and why bubbles burst: 
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Figure 2 
Bubbles can pop because of any extraneous factor that has little correlation with how 
stocks are valued (Diba 1990). Bubble can also pop when previous information 
unknown to most investors becomes known. (Information that was asymmetrical 
becomes symmetrical.) However, the downward spiral of stock prices mirrors the 
upward expansion in a bubble. As seen from the diagrams, bubbles are self-perpetuating 
once they fOlTI1. 
The two examples ofmarket bubbles are the tulip mania and the South Sea land 
speculation bubble. Mackay's book studies the herd mentality ofboth of these events 
(Mackay 1996). Mackay's descliption of the growth rate of the bubble in the South Sea 
land speculation relates to the greater fool theory. John Law infOlmed the public of the 
great prosperity of the company and the people believed that the price could be 
SUppOlted at an even higher level (Mackay 1996). This belief of price SUppOlt in 
overvaluation is once again illuminated by herd mentality. As Diba points out, over 
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reliance on outside recommendations is a signal ofthe presence ofherd mentality. 
One of the most famous bubbles in history is the rise and fall of the stock market 
in 1929. From 1926-1929, the stock market rose 300% (Smant). Like the tulip and 
South Sea bubble; however, economists debate on the presence of a bubble. Smant 
argues that the panic selling on October 24th , 28 th , and 29 th are indicators of a bubble. 
The famous economist Irving Fisher argued that stocks were undervalued even at their 
peak in September 1929. He stated that "the market went up principally because of 
sound, justified expectations of earnings, and only partly because ofunreasoning and 
unintelligent mania for buying." (Gorman) Whether or not a bubble existed is up for 
debate. Some stocks imploded after the 1929 crash while other "speculative" stocks 
like General Motors turned into the ordinary blue chips we see today. 
A legend of Wall Street, Phillip Carret offers insight into successful speculation. 
His book defines the machinery of markets and the vehicles of speculation to better 
understand market bubbles (Carret 1997). Chapter 4 and 5 ofhis book deal with market 
movements in terms of "ripples and waves." Instead ofusing the term market bubble, 
Carret defines market separation from economic fundamentals as a "tide of speculation." 
An example of the "tide ofspeculation" is demonsh'ated in the virtual model constructed 
by an economist from the University ofBonn named Thomas Lux. Lux created a virtual 
model of500 agents trading one commodity (Chang). Some of the traders used a 
strategy that hinged upon the commodity's fundamental value, which fluctuated 
randomly. Others traded based on market trends, a sort of"trader see, trader do" 
strategy (Once again, the greater fool theory arises). Virtual traders could also switch 
strategies depending on which seemed to be doing better (Chang). "We see in our 
model, the price dynamics reflect fundamental values but only to an extent," Lux says. 
"We think this shows one needs to pay more attention, one has to stress more the 
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interaction of agents, which has been neglected in economics up to now" (Chang). 
III. Research Design 
Whether or not a deviation exists from the fundamental stock price is the central 
theme of this research paper. For my research, actual S&P 500 prices will be compared 
with the price predicted by fundamental variables. 
Dependent variable 
The fundamental price equation relies on the actual S&P 500 price. The 
regression analysis presumes that the S&P 500 prices can be explained through 
fundamental variables like book value, earnings, dividends, the federal funds rate, and 
productivity. 
Dependent Variable 
Dependent Variable Description 
S&P 500 Price* Actual monthly S&P 500 prices from 
1985-2000 
*Source: S&P 500 official website. 'NWW.spglobal.com. 
Table I 
Through fundamental analysis, the exponential increase in S&P 500 prices from 
1985-2000 should be explained. Ifthe fundamental equation does not explain the price 
increase (a low r\ then either a bubble exists or the model is incorrect. 
The premise of a bubble is a growing and persistent deviation of stock prices 
from their fundamental values. However, some interesting questions arise. What is the 
fundamental value of a stock and how is it determined? When is the deviation from the 
fundamental price a bubble and when is it simply a random fluctuation? In my model, a 
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deviation that grows in consecutive periods is a bubble. 
The definition ofwhen a bubble is present and when it does not exist is highly 
debated. Some economists argue that a bubble is present when a 5% deviation occurs 
from actual stock prices and their fundamental prices (Kindelberger). Others argue that 
the deviation must be greater. Since the literature I have read often refers to the bubble 
that the market has been in since the mid 1980s, I will interpret a persistent and growing 
deviation as a market bubble. The first step of running the regression is to identify a 
"fundamental" stock price valuation for the S&P 500. By finding the fundamental price, 
I can compare the actual price to the fundamental price. The deviation ofthe price 
between the two represents a market bubble. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables represent the fundamental price of a stock. Under 
rational expectations theory, investors evaluate the price of a stock based on a past and 
future performance. To measure this performance, the fundamental price equation will 
incorporate four variables from 192 observations. These variables are listed in table 2: 
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Independent Variables
 
Independent 
Variable Name 
Description Expected Sign 
Earnings* Monthly index of earnings 
for S&P 500 from 1985­
2000 Positive 
Book Value** Average monthly book 
value for S&P 500 
companies from 1985-2000 Positive 
Dividends* Total dividends distributed 
monthly for S&P 500 from 
1985-2000 Positive or Negative 
Federal Funds Rate*** Monthly federal funds rate 
from 1985-2000 
Negative 
Productivity**** Quarterly productivity of 
labor from 1985-2000 
Positive 
* Source: Shiller's Irrational Exuberance market data. 
hltv://aida.econ. vale.edu/~shiller/data/ie data.htm 
**Source: Barra Investor Research. hit ://"WlVW.barra.com/researcl fundamentals.asp 
***Source: Federal Funds Interest Rate, Monthly, NSA, Percent. 
1-t';1W. economagic. com 
****Source: Productivity and Costs. "WlVW.bls.gov 
Table 2 
As a company increases its earnings, the price of its stock should go up. This 
increase in price is represented by the sum of future earnings increases. An increase in 
book value should behave much the same way. When the book value of a company 
increases, its expected future earnings stream increases. Therefore, the price of the 
stock should go up. 
Intuitively, the increase in dividend payments should increase the price of a 
stock. With a higher payment stream, a commodity is more valuable. Further analysis 
may prove otherwise. Starting in the early 1990s, many boards of directors decreased 
dividend payments. The rationale ofthis decision was that the reinvestment of corporate 
profits was money better spent. Capital gains were a better means ofreturning more 
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value to the shareholder. Furthermore, capital gains tax is far less than income tax 
charged against dividends. Because of the reduction in dividends, a stock's price should 
reflect a greater portion of the earnings stream Hence, the price of a stock should 
increase when dividends are decreased. Whether dividends have a positive or negative 
effect on stock prices will be observed in the rational expectations regression. 
The cost for a company to borrow should influence the price of a stock. The 
cheaper the cost is to borrow, the more a company can borrow to invest in themselves. 
The cost ofborrowing is represented by the federal funds rate. The lower the federal 
funds rate, the cheaper a company can borrow. Also, a low federal fund rate illustrates 
the fact that the fed is willing to accommodate growth with expansionary monetary 
policy. Therefore, the federal funds rate should have an inverse relationship to the S&P 
500 price level. 
Finally, an increase in productivity should create an increase in the price of a 
stock. As technology increases every year, workers become more efficient. Efficient 
workers can produce more output with the same amount of input. This increased 
output means more revenue for a company. According to our model, increased revenue 
means an increase in price. The productivity variable should have a positive effect on 
pnce. 
V. Results 
If all of the variables are significant and correlated to the rapid increase in the 
S&P 500 prices from 1985-2000, then a bubble does not exist. However, if the 
equation does not explain the increases in prices, either: 
a) The model is not set up properly and expectations are still rational 
b) The model is correct and expectations are a rational response to asymmetric 
information (a bubble exists). 
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Initially, rational expectations regression results proved very promising. A high r2 in the 
0.96 range meant that the increase in S&P 500 prices was ahnost entirely due to rational 
expectations theOly. Investors estimated past performance and the future earnings 
stream and incorporated them into the price of a stock. Contrary to the herd mentality 
theolY, investors are rational agents that pick stocks based on their fundamental basis­
not because of the greater fool theory. 
However, autocorrelation was present in the dataset. The most likely 
cause for autocorrelation in the stock data is the concept ofmomentum. Momentum 
arises when the stock price of one month depends on the price of the previous month 
(Bernstein). As William Bernstein stated, "US security prices exhibit some momentum 
over periods of one month" (Bernstein). Bernstein's previous work shows that 
momentum-induced autocorrelation in the stock market is a plausible scenario. 
All hope is not lost when autocorrelation is concerned. There are methods for 
correcting the autocorrelation that afflicts the data. The two methods I am using are the 
Cochrane-Orcutt method and the Prais-Winsten method. 
The Cochrane-Orcutt method runs an initial regression, and then takes the 
estimated residuals and reruns the regression (Boyd 5). An estimate of rho (the 
autocorrelation coefficient) is obtained and the process is iterated until the 
residual sum of least squares is not reduced significantly (Boyd 6). The result is a 
regression model that separates the autocorrelation coefficient from the other 
variables. The significance and correlation of the independent variables with the 
dependent variables can be analyzed apart from the correlation that exists 
between the lagged values of the same variable (Boyd I). 
Much like the Cochrane-Orcutt method, the Prais-Winsten method corrects for 
autocorrelation by applying the ordinary least squares method to transformed variables 
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(Die1rnan and Rose 1). The two methods are nearly identical except how the regression 
treats the first va.I.iable. With the Cochrane-Orcutt method, the first independent 
variable is omitted. In the Prais-Winsten, the first variable is transformed. As Diehl and 
Rose state, "Asymptotically, there is no difference in the efficiency of estimators 
produced by the two methods. In previous studies of small sample behavior; 
however, the superior performance of the Prais-Winsten procedure has been 
documented" (Diehl and Rose I). Since my regression includes 192 observations, 
the autocorrelation should converge with the two methods (The Cochrane-Orcur 
rho should be close to the Prais-Winsten rho). 
In my research, I ran two regressions. The first regression was using the 
Cochrane-Orcutt transformation and the second regression used the Prais-Winsten 
transformation. The results of the two regressions can be seen in Table 3: 
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Regression Results 
Regression Variable Coefficient Significance R2 Estimated 
Rho 
Constant 990.372 .194 
Real 
8.019 .015 
Earnings 
Cochrane­
.452 .995 
Orcutt Federal 
Funds Rate 
-16.662 .041 
Real Book 
Value 
.549 .048 
Real 
14.163 .646 
Dividends 
Productivity .883 .557 
Constant -857.798 .036 
Real 
1L604 .000 
Earnings 
Prais­
.72~ 
. 85 
Winsten Federal 
Funds Rate 
-20.988 .011 
Real Book 
Value 
.612 .033 
Real 
62.9 0 .01 
Dividends 
I 
I 
Productivity 2.348 .118 
Table 3 
After running both regressions, many interesting results appear. First, the signs 
of the independent variables match the predicted signs of the variables in both 
2 The r2 value was computed using the equation (I-(Error Sum of Squares/Total Sum of Squares» 
3 The r2 value was computed using the equation (I-(Error Sum of Squares/Total Sum of Squares» 
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regressIons. Real earnings, real book value, real dividends, and productivity all have a 
positive impact on the S&P 500 price index. Furthennore, the federal funds rate has a 
negative impact on the price of the S&P 500 price index in both regressions. 
The difference in the significance of the coefficients becomes apparent when 
comparing the two regressions. The Cochrane-Orcutt transfonnation has only three 
significant variables at the 0.05 level: real earnings, federal funds rate, and real book 
value. However, all of the Prais-Winsten independent variables' coefficients are 
significant at the 0.05 level except productivity. In both regressions, productivity was 
insignificant. 
The Prais-Winsten method has an r2 value of72% compared to the Cochrane­
Orcutt transfonnation of 45 %. The reason for the Prais-Winsten superior explanatory 
results is unknown and should be analyzed in future research. 
To visually understand the results of the two regressions, figure 3 shows the 
predicted S&P 500 prices for 1985-2000 using the Prais-Winsten transfonnation model 
and the Cochrane-Orcutt transfonnation model compared to the actual S&P 500 price 
level. 
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Predicted vs. Actual S&P 500 Prices 
1600.00 r------==~...,..----~------~---_, 
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-
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-+--S&P Prices (Jan 1985·Dec 2000) 
Cochrane-Ocutt Predicted Prices 
Prais--Winsten Predicted Price Level 
Figure 3 
***Note: The insignificant constant variable Yi'rlS removed from the Cochrane­
Orcutt Predicted Price graph to more accurately portray the fundamental price 
estimation of the S&P 500from 1985-2000. 
As seen from figure 3, both regressions do a decent job at predicting the 
S&P 500 price levels through the end of 1997. However, a dramatic increase in 
price occurs near the beginning of 1998. Previously stated, a market bubble is a 
persistent and growing deviation of actual prices from their fundamental value. 
Is it plausible that a bubble started in the middle part of 19977 As Alan 
Greenspan noted on December 5 1996, the economy was experiencing an 
"irrational exuberance" (Warde). By 1999, Amazon.com, yet to make a single 
penny in profit, was worth more than all the major book chains combined. A day 
after its initial public offering, Priceline.com, a discount airline ticket seller, was 
worth $11.7 billion-more than any other airline (Warde). All ofthese examples 
support the idea that a bubble was forming. 
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VI. Conclusion 
While investors, economists, and researchers are grappling with the idea of 
"what is a bubble," this project has tried to clarify the definition and measure their 
existence. I defined bubbles as the persistent and growing deviation of actual S&P 500 
stock prices from their fundamental valuations. 
The results showed a large deviation of S&P 500 prices from their fundamental 
valuation. Since rational expectation theory explains the fundamental price of a stock, a 
bubble is the only explanation of the large increase in price from 1985-2000. 
Throughout the paper, the focus has been on predicting and measuring bubbles. 
But for the investor, what should be the course of action? Shiller suggests a radical 
approach of getting out of the stock market. 
The high recent valuations in the stock market come about for no good reasons. 
The market level does not, as so many imagine, represent the consensus 
judgment of experts who have carefully weighed the long-term evidence. The 
market is high because of the combined effect of indifferent thinking by millions 
of people, very few ofwhom feel the need to perform careful research on the 
long-term investment value of the aggregate stock market, and who are 
motivated substantially by their own emotions, random attentions, and 
perceptions of conventional wisdom 
Contrary to Shiller's opinion, Phillip Carret opines about a different solution. When 
asked during a time ofpersistently declining prices whether the stocks would rally, he 
laconically responded "They always have." (Carret 1996). It is up to the individual 
investor to decide whose opinion weighs with more importance. 
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VI. Future Research 
While the rational expectation argument presented in this paper gives a 
rough estimate ofthe fundamental price ofthe S&P 500 index, did a decent job of 
predicted the actual S&P 500 prices. However, the deviation ofstock prices from their 
fundamentals can often be explained through the concept ofherd mentality. In the 
future, a model can be built to understand the deviation of stock prices from their 
fundamental value based on the concept ofherd mentality. 
The presence of autocorrelation is extremely high in the data set. In the future, 
Durbin-Watson tests can be applied to the new regression equations. Ifautocorrelation 
still exists, second order autocorrelation may be present. Second order correlation 
usually denotes the need to add other variables to the equatioIL 
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Appendix 
The stock market boom is made up ofa multitude of factors. To suggest that herd 
mentality alone drives stock prices would be unfounded and absurd. While herd 
mentality may start the process ofbubble formation and destruction, other factors like 
momentum, amplification mechanisms, and cultural influences affect the deviation of 
stock prices from their fundamentals. Shiller's book Irrational Exuberance lists twelve 
different causes for the great expansion of stock prices in the 1990s. To fully 
comprehend how bubbles operate, it is necessary to review these theories. Otherwise, 
the concept that herd mentality, measured by consumer confidence, can predict bubbles 
will be overly relied upon. As Phillip Carret points out: 
Prices on the New York Stock Exchange are affected by French politics, Getman 
banking conditions, wars and rumors ofwars in the Near East, the Chinese monkey 
market, the condition of the wheat crop in The Argentine, the temper of the Mexican 
congress as well as by a host of domestic influences. The successful speculator must 
carefully weigh the effect of all these influences, set down the pros and cons and 
arrive at a sound conclusion as to the side on which the balance lies. \\!hen he has 
done all this he has made only a beginning. Ifhe concludes that the balance favors an 
upward movement, he must still decide which stocks he is to buy for maximum profit. 
22
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